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Abstract 
 
This article reviews experimental evidence on the effects of policies intended to 
promote behavior by firms that is more socially responsible and less socially irresponsible. 
Corporate social responsibility (CSR) can provide firms with opportunities for profit, but 
changes are likely to increase total welfare only if firms adopt them freely and without taxpayer 
subsidies. Mandated CSR circumvents people’s own plans and preferences, distorts the 
allocation of resources, and increases the likelihood of irresponsible decisions. Evidence that 
government policies will increase welfare and a compelling argument that proven benefits 
justify reductions in freedom are necessary in order to justify CSR mandates. To date, this has 
apparently not been achieved. Corporate social irresponsibility (CSI) is concerned with 
whether firms undertake harmful actions that managers would be unwilling to undertake acting 
for themselves, or that a reasonable person would expect to cause substantive net harm when 
all parties are considered. Markets in which stakeholders are free to make decisions in their 
own interests provide some protection against CSI. Tort and contract law provide additional 
protection. Nevertheless, managers sometimes act irresponsibly. Codes of ethics that require 
fair treatment of stakeholders while pursuing long-term profit reduce the risk of irresponsible 
decisions. Management support and stakeholder accounting are important for successful 
implementation. Firms may wish to consider these measures; many already have. 
 
Keywords: accountability, affirmative action, decision making, ethics, externalities, free 
markets, minimum wage, paternalism, principle-agent problem, regulation, seer-sucker theory, 
stakeholder accounting, stakeholder theory, sustainability. 
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In economic theory, maximizing the present value of long-term profits is the objective 
of a firm. Some commentators suggest that this objective is insufficient because firms should 
also undertake what they regard as socially responsible activities. The concept of corporate 
social responsibility (CSR) became prominent in the 1960s. Promoters wish to use firms as 
instruments for achieving various social objectives. In addition they are concerned with 
reducing corporate social irresponsibility (CSI).  
Some advocates of CSR and of efforts to reduce CSI suggest that owners and managers 
lack incentives to make socially responsible decisions. As a consequence, the argument goes, 
corporate managers need guidance that will lead them to make responsible decisions. Guidance 
is likely to be insufficient, however, if following the guidance would harm profits. Therefore, 
government incentives and penalties may be required to ensure firms follow the guidance. 
A contrasting view is that firms should be free to pursue the profit-making objectives of 
the owners. In doing so, firms need to develop mutually agreeable arrangements with 
stakeholders—those who have substantive economic interests in the activities of the firm. 
Stakeholders typically include owners, creditors, employees, suppliers, distributors, local 
communities, and customers. Prices and other arrangements adjust to reflect the preferences of 
individuals in each group. With each party free to end its relationships and each protective of its 
reputation, the system is self-monitoring and self-correcting.   
The pursuit of long-term profits encourages firms to treat other parties well and to 
avoid misleading them. For example, firms tell customers about the limitations of their 
products in order to retain the benefits of good long-term relationships and to avoid the costs of 
dealing with disgruntled customers and with lawsuits. If managers treat owners poorly, the 
owners can find new managers. If firms treat other stakeholders poorly, they can seek out firms 
that treat them better. Buyers seek products that best suit their needs. To do this, they can obtain 
independent information from others, search the Internet, use trusted suppliers, or buy well-
known brands. If buyers discover that they have been misled, they can punish the seller by not 
buying the product in the future, demanding a refund, discouraging others from making a 
purchase, posting comments on the Internet, or suing. Finally, there are long-standing legal 
remedies
1
 in both tort and contract law if stakeholders or others are harmed or might be 
harmed.  
Despite explanations by Adam Smith, Friedrich von Hayek, Milton Friedman and 
others, the idea that people should be free to make contracts as they see fit (the so-called 
“invisible hand” of the market) is counter-intuitive for many people. They cannot believe such 
a system can work because it lacks a coordinator and, they argue, the parties are motivated by 
greed. Adam Smith addressed this concern: “It is not from the benevolence of the butcher, the 
brewer, or the baker, that we can expect our dinner, but from their regard to their own interest” 
(Smith 1776/2008, p. 25). In contrast, mandates and subsidies aimed at promoting CSR and 
reducing CSI are based on the belief that governments must provide a guiding hand.  
 
                                                        
1
 Black’s Law Dictionary (Garner, 2009) defines “remedies” as “The field of law dealing with the means of 
enforcing rights and redressing wrongs.” Examples of remedies include: compensatory damages, specific 
performance of contracts, disgorgement of profits, and injunctions. The appropriateness or permissibility of any 
specific remedy depends on the situation.  
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CSR and CSI as Government Regulation 
 
 Regulators face a complex problem if they are to improve on the welfare outcomes 
that arise from free-market interactions. In order to do so, they must meet basic conditions to 
help ensure that regulation will make the situation better than market solutions. In particular, 
welfare is likely to be reduced by a proposed CSR or CSI regulation if the regulator fails to 
meet any of the following common-sense conditions:  
 
1. Know stakeholder’s endowments, relationships, and preferences.  
2. Describe in detail how the situation could be changed to the benefit of those affected.  
3. Design rules that will produce the intended changes.  
4. Design rules that will not produce unintended changes. 
5. Resist pressures to modify the rules in ways that would reduce the total benefit 
6. Ensure those affected by the rules know and understand them. 
7. Establish rewards and punishments to ensure the rules are followed. 
8. Establish fair procedures for resolving disputes arising from enforcement of the rules. 
9. Change rules (see 1–8) when the situation changes (e.g., inventions, scarcities). 
10. Keep the administrative costs of the rules below the value of the benefits. 
 
It would be interesting to learn how many regulations meet these ten conditions. In the 
case of the first, for example, stakeholders themselves do not know their preferences until faced 
with specific choices. Consider the case of a consumer buying a product. Nisbett and Wilson’s 
review of the literature on making decisions concludes, “the accuracy of subjective reports is so 
poor as to suggest that any introspective access that may exist is not sufficient to produce 
generally correct or reliable reports” (1977, p. 233). Customers know what they like even if 
they are not sure why. But how could a regulator know their preferences?
 2
  And might the 
ability to choose for oneself add to one’s enjoyment of life? A study of data from 46 nations 
leads to the conclusion that choice is important to happiness (Veenhoven 2000). Moreover, 
regulation dulls the connection between the preferences of buyers and sellers’ production 
decisions and innovations.  
Rizzo and Whitman (2009) ask a similar question to the one asked in this article, in 
their case about new paternalist or so-called libertarian paternalist policies: do policymakers 
know enough to improve the situation? They propose that government policy makers must pass 
six knowledge tests in order to be confident of improving welfare. They conclude that success 
is unlikely. 
One can also view regulation as a forecasting problem. Legislators, regulators, and 
courts appear to depend on expert judgment to forecast whether a proposed regulation will lead 
to desired outcomes. The question that then arises is, are such forecasts valid? An early review 
of the experimental evidence on forecasting for complex and uncertain situations concluded 
that experts with accurate information are unable to make predictions that are better than those 
made by non-experts (Armstrong 1980). That conclusion was reinforced by a study of more 
than 82,000 judgmental forecasts made over 20 years by 284 experts in politics and 
                                                        
2
 This was apparent to Jeremy Bentham in the late1700s: “It is a standing topic of complaint, that a man knows too 
little of himself. Be it so: but is it so certain that the legislator must know more? It is plain, that of individuals the 
legislator can know nothing: concerning those points of conduct which depend upon the particular circumstances of 
each individual, it is plain, therefore, that he can determine nothing to advantage” (p. 379, 1789/1907).  
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economics (Tetlock 2005). The experts’ unaided forecasts were little more accurate than 
those made by non-experts, and they were less accurate than forecasts from simple 
models. Despite the evidence, most people believe they and their favorite experts are 
exceptions. The disconnection between evidence and belief about expert forecasting is 
described by the Seer-sucker Theory: “No matter how much evidence exists that seers do not 
exist, suckers will pay for the existence of seers” (Armstrong 1980). 
Despite the widespread belief that regulation is useful, the authors were unable to find 
scientific studies that established that regulation was superior to non-regulation in any specific 
case. To the contrary, the effects are typically harmful (e.g., Winston 2006). For example, 
Mandated disclosure and disclaimer regulations, which are intended to provide potential buyers 
(and other stakeholders) with important information, are examples of regulations that seem 
obviously beneficial. U.S. courts have upheld such restrictions on free speech for nearly seven 
decades on the basis of their intuitive appeal: how can more information be harmful? Won’t 
people be protected by guidance and warnings? In light of these commonsense beliefs, it is 
remarkable that all experimental evidence has shown that buyers, and sellers, have been 
harmed by mandated disclosures (Ben-Shahar and Schneider 2011; Winston 2008). The same 
applies to mandated disclaimers (Green and Armstrong 2012).  
Opinions of experts tend to lag decades behind the evidence, and the opinions of the 
general public tend to lag those of the experts. In the early 1900s economists and the general 
public saw a need for regulations of business. This viewpoint persisted in university economics 
textbooks. For example, Paul Samuelson’s Economics advocated central planning. By his 13th 
edition (1989) Samuelson claimed, “the Soviet economy is proof to the contrary to what many 
skeptics had earlier believed, a socialist command economy can function and even thrive” 
(quoted in Skousen 1997, p. 148). However, as Winston (1993) documents, empirical evidence 
on the failures of regulation began to affect economists’ views on regulations. By the late 
1970s, for example, 97% of economists agreed that “tariffs and import quotas reduce general 
economic welfare” and 90% agreed that, “a minimum wage increases unemployment among 
young and unskilled workers” (p. 30, Kearl et al. 1979). For a summary of the state of 
economic knowledge of minimum wage policies, for example, see Gorman (2008). Judging by 
government policies around the world, public opinion and political leadership have yet to catch 
up with evidence on these issues.    
Another way the argument for government intervention is sometimes made is to appeal 
to the economic concept of externalities. Externalities occur when there are benefits or costs to 
third parties that are not reflected in the price of a product. As a consequence, such products are 
assumed to be under or over produced relative to the socially optimal quantity. Third parties 
propose that an externality exists in the market, and that government action is needed in order 
for the market to provide the correct quantity of the product. This is another way of saying that 
sellers, and buyers, are not being sufficiently socially responsible or are being socially 
irresponsible. Given that there is no agreement of what social responsibility is or how much it is 
worth relative other desiderata—nor is it plausible that free people would agree—it is not clear 
how any government or political process could determine the optimal quantity of the product. 
Because firms are guided by prices in their search for profits, they have stronger incentives and 
better means than do regulators to provide the optimal social quantity of a product: the quantity 
and kind that buyers and other stakeholders are willing and able to pay for.  
The belief that regulation is desirable persists despite the lack of experimental evidence 
to support it. Indeed, natural experiments whereby heavily regulated countries such as North 
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Korea can be compared with less regulated countries that were previously similar, such as 
South Korea, provide scant evidence of superior social outcomes. South Korea’s 2012 Index of 
Economic Freedom is 69.9 and its 2010 per capita GDP adjusted for purchasing power is 
$28,600. The equivalent figures for North Korea are 1.0 and $1,100 (Miller, Holmes, Feulner, 
et al., 2012). For further evidence from natural experiments, see for example the statistics 
provided on Wikipedia.
3
  
Government regulations are expected to harm stakeholders because they ignore prices 
and restrict the rights of adults to make contracts with one another. Might it be fair to suggest, 
then, that accepting government subsidies and exploiting protective regulations are examples of 
corporate social irresponsibility? The findings of a study of the deregulation of nine U.S. 
industries (including airlines, railroads, brokerage, telecommunications, and natural gas) were 
consistent with economists’ predictions that consumers would benefit. The general public 
expected the opposite outcome for some industries, such as airlines. Even after de-regulation, 
the general public perceives that airline customers were harmed (Winston 1993). De Soto 
(1989) shows how government regulations lead to socially irresponsible results in poorer 
countries.     
The authors’ review of the evidence on government regulation supports the Iron Law of 
Regulation: “There is no form of market failure, however egregious, which is not 
eventually made worse by the political interventions intended to fix it”. (Original source 
unknown) 
 
CSR and CSI Regulations in Practice  
 
Because agreeing on a definition of CSR is hard if not impossible, firms may be told or 
forced to take actions that seem socially responsible to some people, but which are regarded as 
socially irresponsible by others. For example, should managers of corporations divert money 
from stockholders to charities of their own choosing without the agreement of all of the 
owners? Should managers support social causes that are objectionable to many of the firm’s 
stakeholders? Should firms be forced to discriminate on the basis of race and gender in their 
hiring and promotion decisions? Should managers support sustainability programs that the 
firm’s owners expect will harm welfare? For example, in 2012, according to the National 
Center for Public Policy Research, executives at Target Corporation refused to answer 
stockholder requests for justification of sustainability expenditures. 
Major disagreements over what constitutes socially responsible behavior are common. 
Discrimination based on race, sex, or ethnicity is believed by many to be responsible behavior 
and is endorsed and sometimes enforced by governments. Since the early 1960s, the U.S. 
government has supported present-day discrimination to redress historical disadvantages. For 
example, elite universities discriminate against Asians and southern white males under the 
name of affirmative action. To have the same opportunity for acceptance at America’s elite 
colleges, Asians must score 450 points higher out of 1600 on the SAT tests than people with 
dark skin (Espenshade and Radford 2009, p. 92). It is not immediately obvious how this 
helps to redress previous disadvantages. Moreover, the majority of people in the U.S. do not 
support such discrimination.
4
  
                                                        
3
 http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Eastern_Bloc_economies 
4
 A 2009 nationwide survey of 3,097 registered voters nationwide asked “Do you think affirmative action programs 
that give preferences to blacks and other minorities in hiring, promotions and college admissions should be 
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When the government imposes policies in the name of social responsibility, they tend 
to persist for long periods. This is partly because the costs tend to be dispersed and the benefits 
concentrated. In contrast, participants in free markets are punished if their idea of what is 
socially responsible fails to provide a net benefit. For example, a manager might consider the 
skin tone of a potential employee an important consideration for modeling a range of clothes to 
the advantage of the firm and its customers. If a manager were to adopt an “affirmative action” 
policy that led the firm to hire a web designer based on skin color, on the other hand, this would 
put them at a disadvantage to firms that did not discriminate in this way. Firms in South Africa 
were leaders in rejecting racial policies: they openly disobeyed apartheid laws. Managers 
regarded those actions as good for their firms. 
Some proponents of CSR argue that firms will ultimately earn higher profits if they do 
good deeds. Without an agreed-upon and unambiguous definition of CSR, however, such 
claims cannot be tested. Even were a testable general claim forthcoming, other variables—
including subsidies, tax breaks, and special treatment—and causal ambiguity would require 
experiments for proper testing (Armstrong 2012). Furthermore, investment returns are 
contingent on circumstances and must be evaluated each on its own merits.  
Despite the questionable value of analyzing non-experimental data, many researchers 
have published such analyses to assess the value of CSR. Margolis and Walsh (2003) list 127 
such papers published between 1972 and 2002. About half (50.5 percent) of the 109 studies 
that treated corporate social performance as an independent variable failed to find a positive 
relationship with financial performance. In their review, they found that the 13 previous 
reviewers since 1978 had identified “problems of all kinds in this research… sampling 
problems, concerns about reliability and validity… omission of controls… and [of] moderating 
conditions” (p. 278). No doubt the number of similar studies has grown substantially since the 
Margolis and Walsh review.  
Where corporate social responsibility decisions conflict with the market by asking or 
forcing managers to obey rules that are harmful for their firms, CSR is likely to lead to socially 
irresponsible decisions in the form of penalties imposed on people who have done no harm and 
in the form of distortions in the allocation of resources. Moreover, governments forcing firms 
to allocate resources in particular ways, for example in response to the lobbying of the 
sustainability movement, amounts to a confiscation of property rights. 
 
CSR and CSI as Voluntary Policies 
 
Firms might adopt policies in order to encourage their employees to act responsibly and 
to avoid acting irresponsibly. These practices are informed by the stakeholder theory of the 
firm. For an excellent review of the history and literature on the stakeholder theory, see 
Donaldson and Preston’s (1995), one of the most frequently cited academic papers on social 
responsibility. They approach the problem by looking at whether firms use the stakeholder 
theory (many do), the normative issue (is the stakeholder theory justified on moral grounds?), 
and the instrumental issue (are firms more profitable if they follow stakeholder theory?). They 
conclude that there is a lack of evidence on the instrumental value of stakeholder theory. Partly, 
                                                                                                                                                                     
continued, or do you think these affirmative action programs should be abolished?”: Continued 36%; Abolished 
55%; Unsure 9%. Quinnipiac University Poll. May 26-June 1, 2009. http://www.quinnipiac.edu/institutes-and-
centers/polling-institute/national/release-detail?ReleaseID=1307  
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they write, this lack of evidence is due to the lack of explicit descriptions in the use of the 
stakeholder theory.  
One view of stakeholder theory is that it requires a change in the objectives of the firm. 
Instead of simply maximizing the net present value of profits, (NPV) the stakeholder-theory 
objective of the firm is to maximize NPV subject to treating other stakeholders fairly. This 
view is consistent with Donaldson and Preston’s (1995) argument that the property rights of 
stakeholders provide the moral justification for using stakeholder theory as the basis of the 
management of firms. It is also consistent with beliefs held by managers; for example, in 
Baumhart’s (1968) survey of subscribers to the Harvard Business Review 83% of the 
respondents agreed that, “for corporation executives to act in the interests of shareholders 
alone… is unethical”.  However, to be effective, a firm’s objectives must be explicit and 
measurable. Support for this conclusion is drawn from hundreds of lab and field experiments 
on objective setting (Locke and Latham 2002). 
 
Evidence on Voluntary CSR  
 
The authors conducted searches for experimental and quasi-experimental research 
findings that could provide evidence on the effects of voluntary corporate social responsibility 
and corporate social irresponsibility initiatives. Searches included the Internet and examining 
references in key papers. The authors attempted to contact all those whose findings they had 
referred to in order to ask whether they had accurately summarized the findings, and to ask 
whether evidence had been overlooked. They received replies from most of those they had 
attempted to contact and made extensive changes in response to the replies. 
Many firms have responded to CSR in a rational way by looking for profit 
opportunities. For example, if people are willing to pay three times as much for eggs laid by 
“free-range” chickens, it may be possible for the seller to increase profits. Customers who buy 
them are happier even if they have little idea of what it means for chickens to be raised free-
range, if there is no objective difference in the taste of the eggs, or health effects, and if there is 
no knowledge about the happiness of the chickens. The key is that decisions do not lead to net 
harm. Hence, a firm may find opportunities to increase profits by satisfying customers who 
hold strong beliefs on the lifestyles of chickens. 
Causes might help advertisers establish a link with customers who might otherwise 
resist their appeals. Causes can be of a general nature, such as donations to charities, or firms 
can show how purchasing the product contributes to a social good. An advertisement can 
inform people that the firm is aligned with a popular cause, such as “This ad was printed on 
recycled bio-degradable paper.” To show their support for causes, sellers use phrases such as 
“Fair trade certified,” “Fairly traded,” “Certifiably sustainable,” and “Local.” The terms 
sometimes indicate support by a third party, such as “Rainforest Alliance Certified.”   
Causes can be tied to purchases. In 1983, in what is reputed to be one of the earliest 
examples of tying sales to charitable donations, American Express advertised that they would 
donate a penny to the renovation of the Statue of Liberty for each use of its credit card. 
Compared with the same period in the prior year, it claimed a 28 percent increase in credit card 
usage, a huge increase for such a small offer. For a description on how to use causes to improve 
profits, see Armstrong (2010, pp. 140–141). 
Sainsbury’s, the British supermarket chain, sold “fair trade” bananas at four times the 
price of conventional bananas (Stecklow and White 2004). In an experimental study of coffee-
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buying behavior, the price of cups of coffee advertised as “fair trade” and the price of cups of 
the top selling variety were varied with discounts, which were advertised. Nearly 500 buyers 
were observed and interviewed. Demand for the fair trade variety was much less sensitive to 
price changes (Arnot, Boxall, and Cash, 2006). The Fair Trade approach should not be 
regarded as a CSR panacea, however. While it does some good and little harm as a niche brand, 
the anti-free trade approach of its promoters would be harmful if it became more prevalent 
(Mohan 2010). 
Surveys found that 83 percent of U.S. respondents would have a more positive image 
of a firm if it supported a cause that they respect. And 86 percent of U.K. respondents said they 
would be more likely to purchase from a company associated with a cause (Ellen, Mohr, and 
Webb 2000).  
In summary, it is possible for stakeholders to gain from applications of the CSR 
concept without harming others if the initiatives are voluntary and are not subsidized by 
taxpayers. Failing this, there are strong a priori reasons to expect actions taken in the name of 
CSR will be socially irresponsible, as defined in the next section. This conclusion is not new.  
 
Evidence on Methods to Reduce CSI 
 
This paper uses a definition that was proposed in Armstrong (1977): A decision can be 
considered as irresponsible if it is (1) inferior to other options when all effects upon all parties 
are considered, or (2) a decision that the decision maker would consider unethical in a personal 
capacity.  
Corporate social irresponsibility is a long-standing problem. In a survey of 1,800 
subscribers to the Harvard Business Review, 82 percent of the respondents indicated that their 
industries were likely to have engaged in “unethical practices.” The primary influence in 
making these unethical decisions was reported to be the behavior of the respondent’s boss 
(Baumhart 1968).  
One source of social irresponsibility is that people working for firms might employ 
unethical procedures to increase their personal wealth at the expense of the firm (e.g., 
embezzlement). Owners of firms endeavor to exclude such behavior because it harms 
profitability. The penalties for irresponsible actions by corporate managers can be huge 
(Karpoff and Lott 1993; Lott 1992). A related problem occurs when managers or boards of 
directors deceive the owners. Here again the penalties are high. A study of 585 firms that were 
targeted by the SEC for financial misrepresentations from 1978–2002 found that while legal 
actions led to legal penalties of around $24 million, the reputational losses were more than 
seven times larger (Karpoff, Lee, and Martin 2008). 
Perhaps the major source of irresponsible behavior in firms is people following the 
dictates of their roles even when doing so causes harm. This issue of people following 
instructions in contravention of their own ethical beliefs was examined in Milgram’s (1974) 
“blind obedience” studies on learning. It was unsurprising that he found that people defer to 
authority. What was surprising was the size of the effect. Many “teacher” subjects in Milgram’s 
experiments on learning continued to shock their “learner” subjects even though they thought 
their actions as a teacher were leading the learner to suffer considerable pain and, in some 
cases, death.  
The studies suggest that one way to help reduce the chances that managers will make 
irresponsible decisions is to give them roles that are consistent with responsible behavior. 
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Developing explicit and measurable objectives should help firms to achieve this. For example, 
“The role of our managers is to maximize long-term profits subject to the fair treatment of our 
stakeholders. To that end, managers are expected to report on the effects of the firm’s actions 
on stakeholders in addition to the usual financial reporting requirements.”   
While codes of ethics have long been suggested as a way to reduce irresponsible 
corporate behavior, many codes are neither clear nor operational. A laboratory experiment by 
Brief, et al. (1996) found that a code of ethics for financial reporting failed to reduce a high rate 
of fraudulent accounting because it was vague. Also, it did not involve an attempt to change the 
roles of the participants. Codes might be effective if they reinforce the role of long-term profit 
making subject to satisfactory treatment of the other stakeholders and if they are supported with 
stakeholder accounting. Nothing further should be added, as this would cause confusion.  
Some experimentation has been done to assess the effectiveness of changing the roles 
of managers. Armstrong (1977) conducted an extension of the Milgram experiment by using an 
actual case faced by Upjohn, a pharmaceutical company. The company was facing the potential 
ban of one of its drugs, Panalba, by the U.S. Food and Drug Administration (FDA). After much 
study, a scientific panel concluded unanimously that the drug had serious side effects that led to 
unnecessary deaths. The benefits of Panalba were available from other drugs that did not cause 
fatalities. The Upjohn board of directors decided to use available legal means to delay a ban 
and to continue selling Panalba. This description was drawn from Mintz (1969). 
In the original experiments, participants played the role of one of seven Upjohn board 
members. After receiving background information on the case, the role players were asked to 
choose from one of five responses to the potential banning of the drug by the FDA. The five 
possible responses ranged from immediately removing the drug from the market to taking steps 
to keep the drug on the market.  
This experiment was conducted with 319 groups of subjects from ten countries 
between 1972 and 1977. Thirty-three faculty members conducted them. The 57 control 
groups received no information as to the responsibilities of the firm. None of the control groups 
decided to remove Panalba from the market and 79 percent took the same action as Upjohn: 
“Continue efforts to most effectively market Panalba and take legal, political, and other 
necessary actions to prevent the authorities from banning Panalba.” This decision was 
classified as irresponsible by 97 percent of a convenience sample of 71 similar respondents 
who had not participated in the experiments. Interestingly, subjects in the control group were 
bothered by their decisions, as had occurred in the Milgram experiments, yet in the follow-up 
questionnaire 90% of the subjects were unaware that the experiment dealt with irresponsible 
behavior.   
Because roles exert powerful influences on decision-making, a treatment was devised 
as an attempt to modify subjects’ perceptions so that they would feel responsible to all of the 
firm’s stakeholders. To that end, some subjects were told that Upjohn’s board had passed a 
stakeholder role resolution in 1950 stating,  
The Board’s duty was to recognize the interests of each and every one of its ‘interest 
groups’ or ‘stakeholders’. The stakeholders are those groups that make specific 
contributions to the firm. Thus, the board is to consider the effects of decisions upon 
employees, creditors, stockholders, customers, suppliers, distributors and the local 
community. Furthermore, the board should consider only its own stakeholders in 
making decisions. It shall not attempt to serve the common good or society in general. 
(All of the current board members are well aware of this policy statement.)  
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In another treatment designed to further emphasize the stakeholder role, the above 
description was provided to a Board that was comprised of three representatives of 
stockholders and one representative each for the local community, suppliers, consumers, and 
employees (stakeholders). The stakeholder roles were provided to the subjects before they read 
the materials. Otherwise, it was expected that the subjects would be likely to rationalize their 
initial decisions. 
The effects of the two stakeholder treatments were modest. This was expected due to 
the fact that profit was the only criterion measured. Decision-makers pay little attention to 
unmeasured criteria (see, e.g., Slovic and MacPhillamy 1974). To reinforce the stakeholder 
roles, another experimental treatment was introduced, this time with “stakeholder accounting.” 
The subjects received information on the impact of the decisions upon stockholders, 
employees, and customers. The percentage of highly irresponsible decisions was reduced to 23 
percent when the participants were told that the Board agreed with the stakeholder role for 
directors, and to 22 percent when the Board was composed of stakeholder representatives. The 
socially responsible decisions went from none under the control condition to 12 percent when 
the board adopted the stakeholder view to 29 percent when the board was composed of 
stakeholder representatives (Armstrong 1977). 
In an extension of the Panalba experiment by King et al. (2010), subjects first 
considered the situation and reported the decision they would make as private individuals. They 
were then assigned to stockholder roles. The proportion of socially irresponsible decisions by 
stockholders was lower when they had made the individual out-of-role decision first. 
Computer, rather than face-to-face, interactions also reduced the proportion of socially 
irresponsible decisions, presumably by reducing the group pressures to conform to their 
traditional roles.  
A widely studied quasi-experiment on stakeholder management of companies has been 
going on since 1956. It involves more than 250 companies employing almost 100,000 people in 
the Mondragon cooperative in Spain. The employees own the firm, although not all employees 
have to be owners. The board of directors represents all stakeholders. Statistical analyses by 
industrial economists conclude that these cooperatives perform well in comparison to other 
Spanish companies that produce similar goods (Arando et al. 2010).  
International welding business Lincoln Electric promotes the stakeholder role in the 
firm’s Code of Conduct. The 52-page code encourages reporting of ethical issues with a non-
retaliation policy, and the firm provides Compliance Hotlines in 24 countries and an Internet 
page for reports. The code includes the following questions for employees: 
Question Three: How would it be perceived? 
This question brings into focus the consequences of your decision for both you and for 
Lincoln. It is worth asking: How will this decision affect my reputation and that of the 
Company? How would I feel about my decision if it were reported on the front page of 
the newspaper? Would I be comfortable if my family and friends knew I made this 
decision?  
Question Four: Is it fair to all stakeholders? 
Ethical decision-making demands that you take into account the effects of your 
decision on customers, suppliers, employees, shareholders and the wider community. It 
is important to widen your ethical lens and think about whether the situation or action 
is consistent with our ethical commitments and if it is fair for everyone concerned. 
Who has an interest at stake in the situation, and how significant is it compared to 
others? Who will be helped or hurt by your decision? (Lincoln Electric 2009, p.7–8.) 
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Other companies, such as BB&T, Southwest Airlines, WalMart, and Whole Foods Corporation 
base their conduct on stakeholder theory. They seem to be doing well.  
 
Conclusions 
 
No agreed definition of corporate social responsibility exists, and it seems likely that there 
cannot be one: social responsibility to some people is irresponsible to others. Moreover, views 
on what is socially responsible change over time. It is not enough that some people think today 
that some firms should behave in ways that they regard as more socially responsible. It is 
necessary to provide evidence that proposed changes would increase welfare in practice, and to 
provide a compelling argument that proven benefits justify any reduction in freedom. To date, 
this appears not to have been done. Actions promoted as socially responsible that are forced or 
subsidized suppress the free expression of the needs and concerns of buyers and the efforts of 
sellers to satisfy them. Suppression of free market activity tends to reduce the total welfare of 
society. With economic theory, experimental evidence, and individuals’ preference for freedom 
of choice all against government regulation, there is no obvious need for further research on 
regulation in the name of social responsibility. 
 Voluntary CSR initiatives, on the other hand, can increase welfare. When buyers and 
sellers are free to make their own decisions, the CSR movement can help firms identify 
opportunities for increasing profits by providing benefits to customer and other stakeholders. 
Many firms recognize the marketing opportunities associated with CSR. Experimental research 
might help to choose CSR initiatives that would be effective for firms and their stakeholders.  
Corporate social irresponsibility occurs when a manager makes a decision that is either 
(1) unethical in terms of a manager’s personal values, or (2) inferior to other options when 
considering the effects upon all parties. Avoiding such decisions will likely be consistent with 
the values of most owners and with their objective of long-term profit maximization. As a 
consequence, many owners and their mangers are likely to welcome methods that can help 
them to prevent social irresponsibility.  
Based on experimental research to date, one method that could help to prevent such 
irresponsibility is to change the roles of firms’ managers in such a way that they strive to 
maximize long-term profitability subject to fair treatment of their stakeholders. Stakeholder 
accounting and management support seem important for the success of such initiatives. 
Descriptions of socially responsible roles could be used as the basis of a firm’s code of ethics. 
While there is a need for more experimental studies to learn about the costs and benefits of 
these proposals for reducing corporate social irresponsibility, many firms have already 
implemented some of these proposals with apparent success.  
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